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 TWOMBLY IS THE LOGICAL EXTENSION OF THE MATHEWS V. 
ELDRIDGE TEST TO DISCOVERY 
Andrew Blair-Stanek* 
Abstract 
The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly has baffled and mystified both practitioners and scholars, 
casting aside the well-settled rule for evaluating motions to dismiss in 
favor of an amorphous “plausibility” standard. This Article argues that 
Twombly was not revolutionary, but simply part of the Court’s ever-
expanding application of the familiar three-factor Mathews v. Eldridge 
test, used to determine whether procedural due process requires 
adopting a procedural safeguard. Twombly recognized that misused 
discovery can deprive litigants of property and liberty interests, and, 
thus, consistent with Mathews, requires a safeguard—dismissing the 
complaint. Based on this conclusion, this Article explains Twombly’s 
origins and structure, and suggests a source from which lower courts 
may draw in developing post-Twombly jurisprudence. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly1 
shocked lower courts and litigators when it expressly rejected the rule 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  
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for notice pleading that had been well-settled for half of a century.2 In 
Twombly, a seven-Justice majority disavowed the oft-cited statement 
from Conley v. Gibson3 that “a complaint should not be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him 
to relief.”4 The Twombly court explained that “this famous observation 
has earned its retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, 
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard.”5  
The Twombly decision has thrown lower courts into confusion,6 
making it unclear how to evaluate motions to dismiss under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and their state analogs.7 Motions to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim are one of the fundamental mechanisms by which 
courts handle litigation and determine the scope of addressable legal 
wrongs. The broad impact of Twombly is evidenced by how often courts 
have cited to it—more than 18,000 cases have already cited it at the 
time of this writing, less than two years after it was decided.8 Justice 
Stevens’ dissent in Twombly was almost certainly correct in stating that 
the majority’s opinion would “rewrite the Nation’s civil procedure 
textbooks.”9  
In place of Conley’s “no set of facts” rule, the Twombly Court 
adopted a new “plausibility standard.”10 But the word “plausible” is 
ambiguous. In neither Twombly itself nor the subsequent case of 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal has the Court given guidance on either the meaning of 
                                                                                                                     
 2. Id. at 562–63. 
 3. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).  
 4. Id. at 45–46 (emphasis added).  
 5. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.  
 6. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Considerable uncertainty 
concerning the standard for assessing the adequacy of pleadings has recently been created by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.”) (internal citation omitted). A 
judge on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York has noted that Twombly, 
despite being extremely heavily cited, has created great uncertainty for district court judges. 
Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the Lower Courts 
After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 852 (2008) (“Because 
Twombly is so widely cited, it is particularly unfortunate that no one quite understands what the 
case holds.”).  
 7. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 578 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]wenty-six States and the 
District of Columbia utilize as their standard for dismissal of a complaint the very language the 
majority repudiates . . . .”); see also Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following The Leader: Twombly, 
Pleading Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (2008) (discussing 
whether these states should also adopt the new Twombly standard). 
 8. Result of KeyCiting Twombly using Westlaw’s KeyCite feature. For a point of 
comparison, admittedly arbitrary, KeyCiting the seminal case Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137 (1803), reveals a total of only 3,371 case citations over the past two centuries. 
 9. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 10. Id. at 560–61 (majority opinion).  
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“plausibility” or the content of this new standard.11 The result has been 
substantial confusion in the lower courts.12  
This Article argues that Twombly is merely an extension of the 
familiar and often-used Mathews v. Eldridge13 three-factor balancing 
test applied to property and liberty deprivations imposed by discovery, 
which commences after an unsuccessful motion to dismiss.14 When 
viewed in this familiar framework, the analysis mandated by Twombly 
becomes straightforward, and indeed, well within the institutional 
competency of the judiciary.15 This insight reveals that Twombly is not 
the radical departure alleged by Justice Stevens’ dissent and by a 
number of commentators,16 but rather is a logical progression in the 
Court’s ever-expanding application of the Mathews balancing test.  
Part II of this Article reviews the background of the Twombly 
decision, the opinion itself, and the reaction by lower courts and 
scholars. Part III discusses Mathews and describes how the Supreme 
Court has consistently extended the Mathews three-factor balancing test 
to a wide variety of civil and criminal cases. Part IV then demonstrates 
how Twombly is best read as expanding the Mathews three-factor 
analysis to require the dismissal of a complaint when potential 
discovery abuse violates procedural due process. Finally, Part V 
explores the ramifications of understanding Twombly as part of the 
ever-growing line of cases applying Mathews and discusses the 
likelihood that Twombly is a constitutional—rather than statutory—
decision.  
                                                                                                                     
 11. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).  
 12. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230–31 (3d Cir. 2008) (“What makes 
Twombly’s impact on the Rule 12(b)(6) standard initially so confusing is that it introduces a new 
‘plausibility’ paradigm for evaluating the sufficiency of complaints.”); Robbins v. Oklahoma ex 
rel. Dep’t of Human Servs., 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (“We are not the first to 
acknowledge that [Twombly’s] new formulation is less than pellucid.”); Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 
143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The nature and extent of that alteration is not clear . . . .”); id. at 178 
(Cabranes, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Supreme Court clarify the matter); see also 
United States ex rel. Snapp, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 532 F.3d 496, 502 n.6 (6th Cir. 2008) (“At 
present, there is some confusion . . . .”); Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly, The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and The Courts, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 877, 889–91 (2008) (discussing the 
uncertainty and divergent jurisprudence resulting from Twombly); Joseph A. Seiner, The 
Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 
2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1059 (“The  Supreme Court’s plausibility paradigm abrogated fifty 
years of pleading jurisprudence and left in its place a vague and undefined standard.”); Michael 
C. Dorf, The Supreme Court Wreaks Havoc in the Lower Federal Courts—Again, FINDLAW’S 
WRIT, Aug. 13, 2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20070813.html.  
 13. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  
 14. Id. 
 15. See infra Part V.A. 
 16. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 185, 
305–15 (2007). 
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II.   OVERVIEW OF BELL ATLANTIC V. TWOMBLY 
This Part briefly reviews Twombly’s history and the Court’s 
decision. It then explores the reactions of scholars and lower courts, 
which have been marked by confusion and uncertainty as to the 
meaning of the new “plausibility standard.”  
A.  Background 
In 1982, the Department of Justice and the American Telephone & 
Telegraph Company (AT&T) entered into a consent decree to settle 
their long-running dispute over AT&T’s alleged violations of antitrust 
laws.17 Under this consent decree, in 1984 AT&T divested its local 
telephone services into regional telephone companies,18 often called 
“baby bells,”19 which retained a monopoly over local service in their 
respective regions.20 These “baby bells” would develop into such 
household names as Verizon, BellSouth, and Qwest.21  
With the Telecommunications Act of 1996,22 Congress withdrew its 
approval of these local monopolies and attempted to open up 
competition for local telephone and internet service.23 Despite the 
efforts of Congress and the Federal Communications Commission, 
however, competition in local service markets did not develop, for 
reasons that still remain unclear.24 William Twombly, acting as a class 
representative, filed a class action against the “baby bells” in the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging violations 
under § 1 of the Sherman Act.25 The complaint alleged that local 
competition had failed to develop due to the defendants’ anticompetitive 
behavior, both in keeping out new competitors and in agreeing not to 
enter each others’ territories.26  
In the district court, the “baby bells,” under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, moved to dismiss the complaint for 
                                                                                                                     
 17. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).  
 18. Id. at 141–42.  
 19. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549 (2007). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 550 n.1.  
 22. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 23. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549.  
 24. Id. at 549–50; see also Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (dismissing plaintiff’s complaint alleging breach of the incumbent 
company’s duty to share its network with competitors and holding that the case did not fall 
within the few exceptions to the antitrust law proposition that there is no duty to aid 
competitors).  
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (prohibiting “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations.”). 
 26. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550–51.  
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failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.27 The district 
court analyzed the relevant Second Circuit precedent and discerned a 
requirement that plaintiffs show “at least one ‘plus factor’ that tends to 
exclude independent self-interested conduct as an explanation for 
defendants’ parallel behavior.”28 Because it found no such “plus 
factors” present in the complaint before it, the court granted the motion 
to dismiss.29  
The Second Circuit, however, vacated the district court’s decision, 
reaffirming the continued validity of Conley’s “no set of facts” rule for 
evaluating motions to dismiss.30 The court refused to carve out an 
exception to the Conley rule for antitrust cases, and reemphasized that 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only a “short and plain”31 
statement of facts in the complaint.32 The court clarified that the “plus 
factors,” tending to show a Sherman Act § 1 violation and upon which 
the district court had relied, were indeed appropriate for summary 
judgment or a directed verdict.33 Yet these “plus factors” were, 
according to the Second Circuit, inappropriate on a motion to dismiss 
because the plaintiff would not yet have had the opportunity to pursue 
direct evidence of antitrust liability through discovery.34  
B.  The Supreme Court Opinion 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to address the proper 
standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of 
parallel conduct.”35 The Court thus appeared to have taken only a 
narrowly-defined antitrust case, unlikely to have broad ramifications 
outside of antitrust practice. Neither the parties nor any of the amicus 
curiae briefs requested the retirement of Conley’s “no set of facts” 
rule.36  
After reviewing the facts and spending two paragraphs on the 
economic theory of parallel market conduct,37 he Court delved into the 
“antecedent question of what a plaintiff must plead in order to state a 
claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act.”38 The Court noted that an antitrust 
                                                                                                                     
 27. FED. R. CIV . P. 12(b)(6); Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) . 
 28. 313 F. Supp. 2d at 179.  
 29. Id. at 189.  
 30. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2005).  
 31. FED. R. CIV . P. 8(a).  
 32. 425 F.3d at 108 (quoting FED. R. CIV . P. 8(a)).  
 33. Id. at 113–14.  
 34. Id. at 114–17.  
 35. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007).  
 36. Id. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 37. Id. at 553–54 (majority opinion). 
 38. Id. at 554–55.  
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complaint that is not dismissed will proceed to discovery.39  
The Court then discussed the high burden that discovery imposes in 
terms of both money and time lost.40 The Court cited various theoretical 
and empirical sources discussing how expensive discovery, and 
particularly antitrust discovery, can be.41 For example, research shows 
that, regardless of the substantive area of law, discovery in cases where 
it is actively employed can account for as much as 90% of litigation 
costs.42 The Court also noted that discovery can “take up the time of a 
number of other people.”43  
In response to the dissent’s claim that “careful case management”44 
can check discovery abuse, the Court extensively discussed the inability 
of judicial oversight to avoid wasteful discovery.45 Having painted this 
bleak portrait, the Court proceeded to retire Conley’s “‘no set of facts’ 
language.”46 In place of the Conley formulation, the Court stated that 
“plausibility” was required,47 and indeed used the word “plausible” no 
fewer than eighteen times in its opinion.48 But the Court rather 
disingenuously stated that it was not changing pleading standards.49  
The Court then proceeded to apply what it called the “plausibility 
standard” to the complaint before it.50 Drawing on economic theory and 
history,51 the Court found that the plaintiffs’ class complaint was 
insufficiently plausible, concluding that, “[b]ecause the plaintiffs here 
have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to 
plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.”52 
C.  Reaction 
The Court’s decision has created a great deal of uncertainty.53 An 
initial cause of confusion lay in the question of scope: Did the decision 
apply just to antitrust cases or to all cases where a motion to dismiss 
                                                                                                                     
 39. Id. at 557–58.  
 40. Id. at 558–59. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 559 (citing Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on 
Civil Rules, to Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 
11, 1999), 192 F.R.D. 354, 357 (2000)).  
 43. Id. at 558 (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).  
 47. Id. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 45. Id. at 559 (majority opinion). 
 46. Id. at 567.  
 47. Id. at 560–61.  
 48. Id. at 553, 556–57 & nn.4 & 5, 558–60, 564, 566, 569 & n.14, 570 (including 
“plausible” in its different forms as noun, adjective, or adverb). 
 49. Id. at 569 n.14. 
 50. Id. at 560–61. 
 51. Id. at 567–68.  
 52. Id. at 570.  
 53. See supra note 12.  
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was filed?54 After all, the Court had granted certiorari in Twombly on a 
very narrow antitrust issue, and peppered its discussion with antitrust 
economic theory and research.55 But in the more recent case of Iqbal, 
the Court clarified what the circuit courts had already concluded, that 
Twombly applies to all civil cases.56  
But Iqbal did little or nothing to address the core uncertainty 
introduced by Twombly: What is meant by “plausible”? The Court has 
given no guidance on the content of this vague term, and the lower 
courts have understandably been unable to fashion workable 
definitions.57 In Twombly, the Court insisted that it was not creating a 
new standard, even as it expressly gave Conley’s “no set of facts” rule 
its “retirement”58 and introduced a new “plausibility standard.”59 As a 
result, commentators have called Twombly a “Janus-like opinion”60 that 
“threw a wrench into modern pleading jurisprudence.”61 One federal 
district court judge has stated, “We district court judges suddenly and 
unexpectedly find ourselves puzzled over something we thought we 
knew how to do with our eyes closed: dispose of a motion to dismiss a 
case for failure to state a claim.”62 
III.   THE EVER-EXPANDING APPLICATION OF MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGE 
In contrast to Twombly, the 1976 case of Mathews v. Eldridge63 has 
been met with nearly universal acclaim and acceptance as setting forth 
the standard for determining the requirements of procedural due 
process. Despite its humble beginnings as a case involving termination 
of disability benefits,64 the Mathews test has grown into a core tenet of 
American jurisprudence.  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 54. See Leading Cases, supra note 16, at 310 n.51 (collecting sources).  
 55. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553. 
 56. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,1953 (2009); see, e.g., Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 
550 F.3d 369, 374 (4th Cir. 2008) (applying Twombly in a labor law case); Williston Basin 
Interstate Pipeline Co. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Leasehold & Easement in the Cloverly 
Subterranean Geological Formation, 524 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying Twombly to 
the Natural Gas Act); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(applying Twombly in a civil rights case). 
 57. See supra note 6.  
 58. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63. 
 59. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155–58 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 60. Ryan Gist, Note, Transactional Pleading: A Proportional Approach to Rule 8 in the 
Wake of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1013, 1016. 
 61. Id. at 1014. 
 62. See McMahon, supra note 6, at 853. 
 63. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 64. Id.  
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A.  Overview of Mathews 
The Supreme Court handed down Mathews six years into the 
procedural “due process revolution” launched by the 1970 watershed 
decision, Goldberg v. Kelly.65 In Goldberg, the Court found that by not 
providing a hearing before terminating welfare recipients’ benefits, the 
New York City Social Services Department had denied the beneficiaries 
procedural due process.66 But Goldberg provided insufficient guidance 
for making procedural due process determinations in other areas.  
In Mathews, the Court supplied this missing guidance with a three-
factor test that remains hornbook law.67 George Eldridge’s social 
security disability benefits had been terminated without a pre-
termination hearing.68 Eldridge brought suit against David Mathews, the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, challenging that the lack 
of pre-termination hearings violated procedural due process.69  
The Court reemphasized that procedural due process “is not a 
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and 
circumstances”70 but “is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands.”71 The Court then 
enunciated the three-factor test, which is now known as the “Mathews 
test”:  
[1] the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; [2] the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and [3] the Government’s interest, including 
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.72 
The Mathews test is a way to compare two sets of procedures: It 
compares the baseline of “procedures used”—which is the first set of 
                                                                                                                     
 65. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme 
Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three 
Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 28–29 (1976) (calling Goldberg a 
“landmark case”).  
 66. 397 U.S. at 266; see also Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 
741–42 (1964). 
 67. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 324. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 324–25. 
 70. Id. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 
886, 895 (1961)). 
 71. Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). 
 72. Id. at 335.  
9
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procedures73—against “additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards”—which constitutes the second set of procedures.74 In 
Mathews itself, the baseline was the existing social security procedures, 
including pre-termination written communications and a post-
termination evidentiary hearing.75 The “additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards”76 were mainly the pre-termination evidentiary 
hearing that Eldridge argued was necessary.77  
The Court then set out to analyze the three factors. Considering the 
first factor—private interest—the Court found that a disabled worker 
had a significant interest in continued benefits, albeit less than a poor 
welfare recipient’s interest in continued benefits.78  
For the second factor, the Court considered the existing procedural 
system, which involved pre-termination written communication and 
provided a post-termination evidentiary hearing.79 Against this existing 
procedural system, the Court considered the “additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards”80 that Eldridge argued were necessitated by due 
process: a pre-termination evidentiary hearing.81  
On the second factor, comparing the change in the “risk of an 
erroneous deprivation,”82 the Court concluded that pre-termination 
evidentiary hearing would provide little additional value in reducing 
erroneous terminations of benefits.83 Specifically, assessments of a 
worker’s condition depended largely on written medical documentation, 
which was already considered extensively prior to termination, meaning 
that in-person pre-termination hearings would likely not improve 
accuracy.84  
The Court then considered the third factor—the fiscal and 
administrative burdens of the alternative procedure—which it 
determined would involve a high cost.85 The increased number of 
hearings, with a full opportunity to present evidence, would be 
burdensome on the administrative judges who handle hearings.86 
Moreover, benefits would continue to flow to potentially undeserving 
                                                                                                                     
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 340–43.  
 79. Id. at 343–46. 
 80. Id. at 335. 
 81. Id. at 343–49.  
 82. Id. at 335.  
 83. Id. at 343–47.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 347–48.  
 86. Id.  
10
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recipients during this time of additional hearings, thereby diminishing 
the resources available to deserving recipients.87 Balancing the three 
factors, the Court thereby determined that the alternative procedure of 
pre-termination hearings was not required by due process, and upheld 
the existing procedures.88  
B.  Increasing Favor 
The Mathews three-factor test has become a staple of jurisprudence, 
touching many areas far afield of administrative law or benefits 
terminations. As Judge Richard Posner notes, the three-factor test is the 
“orthodox” approach to determining procedural due process.89 It 
incorporates ideas of cost-benefit analysis beloved by scholars of law 
and economics, while also providing a benchmark for “justice.”90  
The Supreme Court has applied the Mathews test in a surprising 
variety of areas. For example, in Connecticut v. Doehr,91 the Court 
made clear that the Mathews test applies to determining the 
constitutionality of procedural tools available to private civil litigants, 
and struck down Connecticut’s prejudgment attachment statute.92 The 
Court has also used the Mathews test as a benchmark for criminal 
procedure, using it to evaluate everything from the transfer of prisoners 
into “Supermax”facilities93 to forfeitures of real property.94  
The Court has even employed the Mathews test in deciding several 
terrorism-related cases. For example, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,95 the 
plurality applied the Mathews test to determine that an alleged enemy 
combatant with U.S. citizenship, captured in Afghanistan but detained 
in a brig in South Carolina, was entitled to habeas corpus.96 The 
plurality began its analysis by stating that “[t]he ordinary mechanism 
that we use for balancing such serious competing interests, and for 
determining the procedures that are necessary to ensure that a citizen is 
not ‘deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law,’ . . . is the test that we articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge.”97 
Further, in the recent case of Boumediene v. Bush,98 the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                     
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 349. 
 89. Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1351 (7th Cir. 1997) (evaluating 
procedure for handling parking tickets).  
 90. Id.  
 91. 501 U.S. 1 (1991).  
 92. Id. at 10–11.  
 93. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224–29 (2005).  
 94. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53–59 (1993).  
 95. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).  
 96. Id. at 528–37.  
 97. Id. (citations omitted).  
 98. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).  
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again applied the Mathews test, striking down the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 as providing insufficient process to detainees 
at the Guantanamo Naval Base.99 
The Mathews test was, of course, created by the Burger Court and 
has no direct textual basis in the Constitution. But even Justice Scalia, 
dedicated to an originalist understanding of the Constitution, accepts the 
applicability of Mathews—at least whenever the Constitution does not 
already provide a relevant procedure,100 as, for example, in cases where 
the Constitution specifies the availability of a jury trial.101 This is a 
testament to Mathews’ place at the core of American jurisprudence.  
In light of the Supreme Court’s deep—and growing—attachment to 
the Mathews test, it is not surprising that the lower federal and state 
courts have used it to evaluate alternative procedures ranging from 
domestic relation temporary restraining orders (TROs),102 to sex 
offender commitment,103 to parking tickets.104  
C.  Applied to Civil Procedure in Connecticut v. Doehr 
In resolving the case of Connecticut v. Doehr,105 the Court crafted an 
important variation on the Mathews three-part test, adapting it to private 
civil litigants’ use of the court system. The Court replaced the 
government’s interest with the adversary’s interest for the third 
Mathews factor.  
Brian Doehr had allegedly assaulted John DiGiovanni, who filed a 
tort suit in Connecticut state court.106 DiGiovanni then made use of 
Connecticut’s ex parte prejudgment attachment procedure to attach 
Doehr’s house.107 In order to effect this attachment, DiGiovanni 
submitted only an affidavit stating that he believed “probable cause” 
existed that he would win the tort suit.108 Doehr responded to this 
attachment by filing a suit in federal court that eventually wended its 
                                                                                                                     
 99. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2268.  
 100. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 575–76 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Connecticut 
v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 36 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 101. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 573–76 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In general, Justice Scalia 
has often argued that notions of due process are relevant only when the Constitution does not 
already provide a specific answer. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145 
(2006) (“[T]he Government’s argument in effect reads the Sixth Amendment as a more detailed 
version of the Due Process Clause—and then proceeds to give no effect to the details.”).  
 102. Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F. Supp. 756, 763–64 (W.D. Wis. 1988).  
 103. People v. Litmon, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 135–36 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).  
 104. Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1351 (7th Cir. 1997).  
 105. 501 U.S. 1 (1991).  
 106. Id. at 5.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 6–7.  
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way to the Supreme Court.109  
In analyzing Connecticut’s prejudgment attachment statute, the 
Supreme Court cited Mathews and quoted its “truism that due process, 
unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed 
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”110 It then noted that 
Mathews weighed government interests against private interests, while 
procedural tools such as Connecticut’s prejudgment attachment pitted 
private interests against other private interests.111 As a result, the Court 
stated, “the inquiry is similar, but the focus is different.”112 The Court 
then laid out the applicable variation on the Mathews test:  
For this type of case, therefore, the relevant inquiry 
requires, as in Mathews, [1] consideration of the private 
interest that will be affected by the prejudgment measure; 
[2] an examination of the risk of erroneous deprivation 
through the procedures under attack and the probable value 
of additional or alternative safeguards; and [3] in contrast 
to Mathews, principal attention to the interest of the party 
seeking the prejudgment remedy, with, nonetheless, due 
regard for any ancillary interest the government may have 
in providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden of 
providing greater protections.113 
As in any Mathews analysis, the Court in Doehr had to compare an 
existing baseline of procedures against alternative procedures. 
Specifically, in Doehr, the existing baseline was the Connecticut 
prejudgment attachment statute, including its ex parte attachment upon 
the filing of an affidavit of “probable cause.”114 Meanwhile, the 
“additional or alternative safeguard” under consideration was a hearing 
prior to the attachment, which Doehr contended was necessary.115 After 
considering this safeguard, four Justices went even further, analyzing 
the probable value of yet another “additional or alternative safeguard”: 
the requirement of posting a bond.116  
The Court briefly analyzed the first factor, noting that while 
attachment does not result in physical deprivation, “the Court has never 
                                                                                                                     
 109. Id. at 7. 
 110. Id. at 10 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976)) (quotation marks 
and alterations omitted).  
 111. Id. at 10–11. 
 112. Id. at 10. 
 113. Id. at 11.  
 114. Id. at 5, 12–13. 
 115. Id. at 15.  
 116. Id. at 18–23 (encompassing Part IV of the opinion, which included a plurality 
composed of Justice White joined by Justices Marshall, Stevens, and O’Connor). 
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held that only such extreme deprivations trigger due process 
concern.”117 Listing the potential consequences to private litigants 
whose property is attached, including impaired title and damaged credit, 
the Court found the private interest “significant.”118  
In considering the second factor, the Court compared Connecticut’s 
procedure against the “additional or alternative safeguards” that might 
be provided, such as a pre-attachment hearing or posting a bond.119 The 
Court concluded that the risk of erroneous deprivation under the 
existing procedures was “substantial”120 and could easily be improved 
by requiring a pre-attachment hearing.121 The four Justices willing to 
consider the further additional safeguard of requiring posting of a bond 
determined that due process also required that protection.122  
Finally, the Court considered the third factor, which it had restated 
for private litigation as “the interest of the party seeking the 
prejudgment remedy, with, nonetheless, due regard for any ancillary 
interest the government may have.”123 The Court concluded that the 
private “party seeking the prejudgment remedy,” specifically the tort 
plaintiff John DiGiovanni, had virtually no interest in the prejudgment 
attachment, as opposed to later attachment.124 The Court noted “there 
was no allegation that Doehr was about to transfer or encumber his real 
estate,” so the alternative safeguard of providing a pre-deprivation 
hearing would not have harmed DiGiovanni’s interest.125 Additionally, 
the state’s ancillary interest was nonexistent over the alternative 
safeguards, as state courts already provided post-deprivation 
hearings.126  
Weighing the three Mathews factors, as restated for the protection of 
private litigants, the Court unanimously adjudged that procedural due 
process could not tolerate Connecticut’s prejudgment attachment 




                                                                                                                     
 117. Id. at 12 (majority opinion).  
 118. Id. at 11–12.  
 119. Id. at 12–15.  
 120. Id. at 12.  
 121. Id. at 15.  
 122. Id. at 23 (plurality opinion).  
 123. Id. at 11 (majority opinion).  
 124. Id. at 16. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 24.  
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D.  Balancing and Reasonableness 
The Mathews test balances factors (1) and (2) against factor (3).129 
Factor (1) measures the private interest, while factor (2) is the decreased 
risk that this private interest will be erroneously taken away.130 Factors 
(1) and (2) together thus account for the total benefit, in terms of 
lowered risk of erroneous deprivation, of adopting an alternative 
procedural safeguard.131 On the other side, factor (3) accounts for the 
total costs to the government and adverse parties, of adopting the 
alternative safeguard.132 If the benefits shown by factors (1) and (2) 
exceed the costs shown by factor (3), then procedural due process 
requires adopting the alternative safeguard.133 To understand the 
application of the Mathews test, one must consider the scope of each of 
the three factors.  
Factor (1) is the private interest at stake. In Mathews this was the 
property interest in the social security disability benefit,134 while in 
Doehr it was the property interest in having unclouded title to one’s real 
estate.135 Of course, the factor may also include or consist entirely of a 
liberty interest, such as the freedom of an enemy combatant,136 the 
interest of an Ohio prisoner not being in a “Supermax” facility,137 or in 
having a good reputation.138  
Factor (2) in the Mathews test is the decrease in risk of erroneous 
deprivation of the private interest. So if the proposed procedure does 
little to decrease the risk of erroneous deprivation over the existing 
baseline procedures, then the value of this variable will be small. But if 
the proposed procedure significantly decreases the risk of erroneous 
deprivation, then the value of this variable will be large. In Mathews 
itself, this factor had little weight, as the Court found that the accuracy 
of the existing baseline, pre-deprivation consideration of written 
medical evidence, would not be significantly improved by in-person 
pre-deprivation hearings.139 By contrast, in Doehr, this factor had 
                                                                                                                     
 129. The Mathews test may be expressed as an extremely simple mathematical formula 
involving the three factors. See RICHARD J. PIERCE JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
PROCESS 281 (5th ed. 2009). Procedural due process requires an alternative procedure if the 
following inequality is true: P x V > C. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 
 135. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1991). 
 136. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). 
 137. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 213 (2005). 
 138. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574–75 (1975). But see Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 
(1995) (illustrating a general trend by the Court to restrict the definition of liberty interests).  
 139. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344.  
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greater weight, as a litigant could invoke prejudgment attachment in a 
very weak case upon filing an affidavit of “probable cause.”140  
Finally, Mathews factor (3) is the increased cost—or risk of loss—on 
the government or private adversary. In Mathews itself, this variable 
was simply the additional cost of a hearing prior to social security 
disability benefits termination, which Eldridge argued was necessary.141 
In Doehr, which involved private litigants, this factor was “the interest 
of the party seeking the prejudgment remedy, with, nonetheless, due 
regard for any ancillary interest the government may have in providing 
the procedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater 
protections.”142 Specifically in Doehr, factor (3) consisted primarily of 
the risk that DiGiovanni, the tort plaintiff allegedly assaulted by Brian 
Doehr, would have no assets to satisfy his judgment if he prevailed in 
his tort suit.143 Additionally, the government had an interest in forgoing 
the pre-attachment hearing, which the Court characterized as de 
minimis since it would impose no additional costs on the courts.144  
In incorporating the government’s interests into factor (3), the Court 
used very flexible language: “any ancillary interest the government may 
have in providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden.”145 This 
language recognizes that the government’s interest may increase—or 
decrease—factor (3)’s weight, as the government may have an interest 
in either “providing” or “forgoing” the alternative procedure.146 In other 
words, the government’s interests may augment or offset the adverse 
party’s interests as captured in factor (3). In this way, the Mathews test, 
as adapted to private litigation by Doehr, recognizes that the 
government’s interest may weigh either against or in favor of adopting 
the alternative procedure.  
Commentators147 have noted that the Mathews three-factor balancing 
test is essentially the same as the three-factor negligence test set out by 
Judge Learned Hand in the famous case United States v. Carroll Towing 
Co.148 In that admiralty case involving barges, Judge Hand set out a 
comparison of the “(1) [t]he probability that [the boat] will break away; 
(2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; [and] (3) the burden 
of adequate precautions.”149 In effect, the Mathews test, as a variant of 
                                                                                                                     
 140. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 13.  
 141. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347. 
 142. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11.  
 143. Id. at 16.  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 11.  
 146. Id. 
 147. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 593–94 (7th ed. 2007). 
 148. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).  
 149. Id. at 173. Learned Hand then put this comparison into algebraic terms: “Possibly it 
serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; 
the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: 
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Judge Hand’s test, aims to ensure that agencies and courts do not 
negligently provide inadequate procedural protections. Judge Hand’s 
test has become the core theoretical and practical underpinning of 
“reasonableness” in tort law.150 Similarly, under the Mathews balancing 
test, procedural due process requires “reasonable” process.151  
IV.   TWOMBLY’S APPLICATION OF THE MATHEWS FACTORS 
Many courts and scholars have found the heightened “plausibility” 
standard introduced in Twombly to be revolutionary.152 But this Article 
argues that Twombly is simply another step in the Court’s continued 
extension of the Mathews test, specifically to the possible property and 
liberty deprivations worked by discovery. In Twombly, the Court 
continued the trend utilized in Doehr of applying Mathews to determine 
whether the tools available to private litigants violate procedural due 
process.153  
Indeed, in Twombly the Court addressed the same relevant inquiries 
for the three Mathews factors: (1) private interests; (2) decreased 
likelihood of erroneous deprivation; (3) government or adversary’s 
interest.154 The Court addressed these factors, moreover, in the same 
order as Mathews and its progeny list and address the three factors,155 
further demonstrating how Twombly is a logical extension of the 
Mathews test.  
A.  Factor 1: Private Interests 
The first Mathews factor is, of course, the private interest affected, 
either of life, liberty, or property.156 In Twombly, the Court considered 
                                                                                                                     
i.e., whether B < PL.” Id.  
 150. See, e.g., Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1564 (7th Cir. 1985); Andros Shipping 
Co. v. Panama Canal Co., 298 F.2d 720, 725–26 (5th Cir. 1962). See generally Stephen G. 
Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable Person 
Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813 (2001) (discussing how Judge Hand’s test fits 
into the broader fabric of negligence law).  
 151. Cf. Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 659 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying the Mathews test 
to determine whether a procedural requirement is reasonable).  
 152. See supra note 12.  
 153. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). 
 154. Id. 
 155. The Court in Twombly addresses the Mathews factors in order, discussing (1) 
discovery costs and the “time of a number of other people,” id.; (2) the baseline of the Conley 
discovery-friendly approach and its risks, id. at 561–62; and (3) evaluating the adversary’s 
interests, especially the weak value of his claims, d. at 566–67.  
 156. It is well established that procedural due process is required whenever a deprivation is 
worked on a relatively small group of people, but not when it affects a large group. C mpare 
Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908) (holding that due process 
requires a hearing for individuals), with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 
U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (“Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is 
impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption. . . . General statutes 
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how proceeding to discovery in an antitrust suit would deprive 
litigants157 of property and liberty interests.  
1.  Property Interest: The Monetary Cost of Discovery 
Money is clearly a form of property,158 and the Twombly court 
extensively discussed the monetary costs imposed on defendants by 
discovery in antitrust cases.159 The Court noted “that proceeding to 
antitrust discovery can be expensive,”160 citing lower court cases that 
discussed antitrust cases’ “inevitably costly and protracted discovery 
phase”161 and deploring “the costs of modern federal antitrust 
litigation.”162 It also cited scholarship that developed models explaining 
“the unusually high cost of discovery in antitrust cases.”163  
But the Court did not stop at citing authority discussing the high cost 
of discovery in antitrust cases. It also quoted from a treatise discussing 
the “expenditure of time and money by the parties”164 on discovery in 
cases from all substantive areas. The Court also referred to a 
memorandum from the Chair of the Advisory Committee on the Civil 
Rules of Civil Procedure noting that in all types of cases in which the 
parties actively utilize it, discovery can account for as much as 90% of 
litigation costs.165  
                                                                                                                     
within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to 
the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard.”). There were only four defendants 
in Twombly, and most lawsuits involve a discrete, limited number of defendants. As a result, the 
strictures of procedural due process apply in such a litigation context.  
 157. In most circumstances, the litigant at risk of deprivation in the Twombly-Mathews 
analysis will be the defendant. But that will not always be the case, as the Twombly-Mathews 
analysis also applies to defendants asserting counterclaims against plaintiffs, crossclaims, and 
claims against third–party defendants. See FED. R. CIV . P. 13. The language in Rule 12(b)(6), 
governing motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, applies equally to a plaintiff’s claim as 
it does to a counterclaim or a crossclaim. SeeFED. R. CIV . P. 12(b); cf. R. David Donoghue, The 
Uneven Application of Twombly in Patent Cases: An Argument For Leveling The Playing Field, 
8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2009) (discussing the peculiar problems that Twombly 
has caused for defendants in patent litigation).  
 158. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 789 (2005) (citing Bd. of Regents of 
State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571–72 (1972)).  
 159. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. (citing Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. 
Ill. 2003)) (emphasis added).  
 162. Id. (citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)) 
(emphasis added).  
 163. Id. (citing William H. Wagener, Note, Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee Shifting 
on Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1887, 1898–99 (2003)) 
(emphasis added).  
 164. Id. (citing 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT &  ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)) (emphasis added).  
 165. Id. at 559 (citing Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on 
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Having reviewed the high monetary costs of discovery, particularly 
antitrust discovery, the Court concluded that the “potential expense is 
obvious enough in the present case.”166 In particular, the Court noted the 
vast amount of data that would be at issue167 and the huge expense that 
discovery would impose on the defendants.168  
2.  Liberty Interest: “The Time of a Number of Other People” 
The guarantee of procedural due process obviously also protects 
private interests in liberty,169 including freedom from being detained by 
those acting under governmental authority. Although the Court certainly 
placed less of an emphasis on the liberty interests than on the property 
interests infringed by costly discovery, it did note that proceeding to 
discovery would allow the plaintiffs to “take up the time of a number of 
other people,”170 presumably mainly through depositions.  
Depositions indeed invade the liberty of the deponent, who is 
judicially compelled to attend the deposition under threat of a court’s 
contempt powers.171 To support such a conclusion, the Court relied 
heavily upon Judge Frank Easterbrook’s article Discovery as Abuse,172 
which makes the point about the loss of liberty much more bluntly, 
stating that discovery requires “taking employees of a corporation out of 
work and holding them captive in lawyers’ offices during 
depositions.”173  
B.  Factor 2: Reduction in Risk Through Alternative Procedure 
The second Mathews factor, as stated by the Doehr Court, is “the 
risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures under attack and 
the probable value of additional or alternative safeguards.”174 This 
factor expressly contemplates the comparison of baseline procedures 
against additional or alternative procedures.  
The baseline of “procedures under attack” in Twombly was the 
                                                                                                                     
Civil Rules, to Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 
11, 1999), 192 F.R.D. 354, 357 (2000)).  
 166. Id. (emphasis added).  
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. 
 169. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.  
 170. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 
(2005)) (emphasis added).  
 171. See FED. R. CIV . P. 30(a)(1) (“The deponent’s attendance may be compelled by 
subpoena under Rule 45.”).  
 172. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559–60 & n.6 (quoting Frank Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 
69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638–39 (1989)).  
 173. Easterbrook, supra note 172, at 645 (emphasis added).  
 174. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991). 
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modern system of discovery, followed by summary judgment.175 The 
alternative safeguard contemplated and ultimately ordered by the Court 
was the granting of a motion to dismiss.176  
The Twombly Court recounted “the common lament that the success 
of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the 
modest side.”177 It made clear that the risk of erroneous deprivation was 
unacceptably high under the baseline of normal discovery and summary 
judgment, no matter how skillfully that baseline procedure is applied.178 
The Court found that “it is self-evident that the problem of discovery 
abuse cannot be solved by ‘careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary 
judgment stage.’”179 The risks of erroneous deprivation under the 
baseline procedure of discovery, followed by summary judgment, could 
not be mitigated even by “careful case management,”180 thereby 
weighing strongly in favor of the alternative safeguard of dismissal.  
To support its assertion that discovery created an unacceptable risk 
of erroneous deprivation, the Court once again relied heavily on Judge 
Easterbrook’s scathing critique of modern discovery.181 The Court’s 
conclusion suggests a lack of hope in the current system: “Judges can 
do little about impositional discovery” 182 and “[g]iven the system that 
we have, the hope of effective judicial supervision is slim.”183  
The Court also noted an additional consideration that increased the 
risk of erroneous deprivation—“the threat of discovery expense [that] 
will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before 
reaching” summary judgment.184 This outcome, of course, results in a 
deprivation of property regardless of whether liability can be established 
after all facts come to light. This situation presents the quintessential 
risk of erroneous deprivation—liability imposed without regard to legal 
and factual merits.  
C.  Factor 3: Adversary’s Interest 
The third factor to be weighed in the litigation context, as stated in 
Doehr, is principally “the interest of the party seeking the prejudgment 
remedy.”185 In Doehr, that interest was the marginally increased 
likelihood that DiGiovanni would have available “assets to satisfy his 
                                                                                                                     
 175. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–61. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 559.  
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. (quoting id. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).  
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. (quoting Easterbrook, supra note 172, at 638). 
 183. Id. at 560 n.6.  
 184. Id. at 559.  
 185. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991). 
20
Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss1/1
2010] TEST TO DISCOVERY 21 
 
judgment if he prevailed on the merits of his action.”186  
Stated another way, this factor was Doehr’s interest in having assets 
to satisfy the judgment, discounted by the likelihood that, without the 
attachment, there would be insufficient assets available. But the Court 
found that likelihood to be quite small, noting that “there was no 
allegation that Doehr was about to transfer or encumber his real estate 
or take any other action during the pendency of the action that would 
render his real estate unavailable to satisfy a judgment.”187 Because of 
this small likelihood, the Court gave factor (3) minimal weight.188  
In other cases applying the Mathews test, the Court has similarly 
analyzed factor (3) in light of the adversary’s interest discounted by the 
likelihood that the alternative procedure would leave the adverse party 
without any remedy, even in cases where the adverse party has an actual 
entitlement to a remedy. For example, the Court has required pr -
deprivation process for civil forfeiture of real property by the 
government,189 but allows mere post-deprivation hearings for civil 
forfeiture of moveable personal property.190 The Court justifies these 
divergent results by noting that the likelihood that moveable personal 
property will be moved elsewhere makes the provision of only post-
deprivation process acceptable.191  
The plaintiffs in Twombly similarly had an interest in damages if the 
defendants had indeed violated the Sherman Act.192 Just as striking 
down the Connecticut pre-judgment attachment at issue in Doehr 
created the possibility that plaintiffs such as DiGiovanni might not have 
assets to satisfy any judgment, granting the motion to dismiss in 
Twombly meant that plaintiffs might not receive recovery for the 
defendants’ anticompetitive behavior. But just as the Doehr Court 
discounted the likelihood that DiGiovanni would not have assets to 
satisfy his judgment,193 the Twombly court found it unlikely that the 
plaintiffs would uncover evidence of anticompetitive behavior.194  
Much of the Twombly Court’s discussion of the complaint can be 
seen as discounting the plaintiffs’ right to recover based on the low 
likelihood that an antitrust violation had occurred.195 Drawing upon 
economic theory and intuition, the Court made clear that nothing in the 
                                                                                                                     
 186. Id. at 16.  
 187. Id.  
 188. Id. 
 189. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 43–44 (1993).  
 190. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679–80 (1974).  
 191. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 56–57.  
 192. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564–70 (2007). 
 193. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 16.  
 194. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564–70 (2007). 
 195. Id. 
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complaint suggested any likelihood of success.196 It noted that “resisting 
competition is routine market conduct”197 and that not entering 
competitors’ markets is “not suggestive of conspiracy, not if history 
teaches anything.”198  
In discussing the lack of plausibility in the Twombly plaintiffs’ 
complaint, the Court effectively determined that the plaintiffs had very 
little legitimate interest in being allowed to proceed to discovery versus 
having their complaint dismissed.199 As a result, the plaintiffs had a 
minimal interest under factor (3) of Mathews. 200 
The Court additionally recognized that the attorneys behind the 
Twombly class action were acting rationally in bringing the suit because 
of the “in terrorem increment of the settlement value”201 posed by the 
extensive discovery that would be required.202 Yet the Mathews analysis 
does not take into consideration such illegitimate interests. The 
prejudgment attachment at issue in Doehr, for example, undoubtedly 
gave plaintiffs a stronger position in negotiating settlements, but the 
Doehr Court did not consider that advantage as contributing in any way 
to Mathews factor (3).203  
D.  Balancing the Mathews Factors 
Recalling that the Mathews test involves balancing factors (1) and 
(2) against factor (3),204 the Supreme Court’s analysis shows why 
dismissal was justified as an alternative procedure to discovery. The 
Twombly Court gave every reason to believe that the weight of private 
interests of the defendants, Mathews factor (1), was great,205 based on 
the huge expense of discovery, both in terms of money and the time of 
individuals held captive in depositions.206 Similarly, the Court 
determined that the reduction in the risk of erroneous deprivation 
through using the alternative procedure of dismissal, M thews factor 
                                                                                                                     
 196. Id. at 566. 
 197. Id.  
 198. Id. at 567.  
 199. Id. 
 200. The U.S. Supreme Court has, more generally, registered its suspicion of class actions 
in recent years. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 84–
85 (2006) (finding federal preemption of state law securities class actions); Dura Pharms., Inc. 
v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (affirming dismissal of securities fraud suit); ee also 
Saritha Komatireddy Tice, A “Plausible” Explanation Of Pleading Standards, 31 HARV. J.L. &  
PUB. POL’Y 827, 837 (2008) (discussing the Supreme Court’s solidifying hostility toward 
litigation).  
 201. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S. at 347).  
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See supra Part III.D.  
 205. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. 
 206. Id. 
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(2), was also substantial.207 It noted that careful case management and 
summary judgment would come too late to avoid the deprivation 
worked by discovery.208  
By contrast, it appears that the interests of the plaintiffs, Mathews 
factor (3), weighed less, based on the Court’s reading of the complaint. 
There was little reason to believe that the plaintiffs had a real, legitimate 
claim. As a result, by allowing dismissal of the suit as an alternative 
procedure to allowing discovery, the plaintiffs lost little of legitimate 
value.  
Weighing all three factors yields a clear result. Both factors (1) and 
(2) are substantial, with large private interests involved, and with a 
significant decrease in the likelihood of erroneous deprivation of these 
large private interests. Yet factor (3) is insubstantial, given the lack of 
reason to believe that the plaintiffs had a valid claim. Viewed in this 
manner, dismissing the Twombly complaint was clearly proper under 
the Mathews three-factor test, and it is unsurprising that this disposition 
garnered the votes of seven Justices.209  
E.  Stevens’ Dissent  
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsberg, dissented, arguing 
largely that the majority failed to adhere to long-standing precedent.210 
Yet Justice Stevens did not reject the Mathews-based analysis, but 
simply would have adopted a different baseline.211  
As noted earlier, the Mathews test is really a way to compare 
proposed “additional or substitute procedural safeguards” against a 
baseline of existing procedures.212 The majority viewed the baseline as 
the textbook course of a civil action in federal court, moving through 
full discovery, summary judgment, and perhaps trial.213  
But Justice Stevens saw a different baseline, involving “careful case 
management, including strict control of discovery.”214 He wrote, “[I]f I 
had been the trial judge in this case, I would not have permitted the 
plaintiffs to engage in massive discovery based solely on the allegations 
in this complaint.”215 He would have allowed, perhaps, only a 
deposition of “at least one responsible executive representing each” 
                                                                                                                     
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 577–78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 211. Id. 
 212. See supra text accompanying notes 73–74.  
 213. See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 1–14 (9th ed. 
2005).  
 214. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 215. Id. at 593.  
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defendant.216  
This baseline, of course, provides little deprivation of the private 
interests of the defendants, Mathews factor (1). Against this baseline of 
limited discovery, the dissent argued that dismissal was not justified. 
Although attitudes on stare decisis and antitrust law217 may have 
influenced Justice Stevens’ dissent, this difference regarding baselines 
perhaps explains the divergence within the Twombly Court.  
F.  Lack of Interlocutory Review 
For both the majority and dissent in Twombly, the baseline procedure 
under consideration was full, extraordinarily expensive, and time-
consuming discovery against the defendants. It appears that all nine 
Justices agreed that this baseline was inappropriate, but differed over 
the relevant alternative to consider. While the majority found dismissal 
to be the appropriate alternative, the dissent would have adopted the 
plaintiff’s “proposed . . . plan of ‘phased discovery’ limited to the 
existence of the alleged conspiracy and class certification.”218  
Why did the majority opt for dismissal as the appropriate alternative 
procedure against which to apply Mathews? Some might see it as 
draconian to dismiss a case entirely because of the potential burdens of 
discovery. The majority’s primary motivation was doubtless “the 
common lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking 
discovery abuse has been on the modest side.”219  
But the majority might also have preferred dismissal as the 
appropriate alternative partly because of the unavailability of 
interlocutory review of discovery orders, either by appeal or writ of 
mandamus. The federal courts strongly disfavor interlocutory review of 
district courts’ discovery rulings.220 Thus, the normal route for 
interlocutory appeal of a discovery order is to refuse to comply, be cited 
for criminal contempt, and immediately appeal the criminal contempt 
citation.221 This route is not for the faint of heart and is not sensible 
                                                                                                                     
 216. Id.  
 217. Id. at 594 (referring to the “common sense of Adam Smith” regarding anticompetitive 
tendencies). Note that Justice Stevens was an antitrust practitioner and academic earlier in his 
career. See Spencer Weber Waller, Market Talk: Competition Policy In America, 22 L. &  SOC. 
INQUIRY 435, 445 (1997).  
 218.  Compare Twombly, 550 U.S. at 593 (Stevens, J., dissenting), with id. at 560 n.6 
(majority opinion). Note that Justice Breyer, in his dissent in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ultimately argued 
for this alternative of phased discovery as the proper way to vindicate this interest in the 
qualified-immunity context. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1961–62 (2009). 
 219. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.  
 220. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690–91 (1974); MDK, Inc. v. Mike’s Train 
House, Inc., 27 F.3d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1994); Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of 
Ariz., 881 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (2006).  
 221. 15B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914.23, 123 
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without a very strong argument against the discovery. Yet even then, 
this route fails to offer a realistic avenue for constitutional review of the 
totality of discovery in a case. The appellate court would not be able to 
see and consider and review the aggregate deprivation worked upon the 
party, only the deprivation worked by individual discovery orders.  
Requesting a writ of mandamus from an appellate court has this 
same drawback and is nearly impossible for litigants to obtain except in 
“really extraordinary” cases.222 Courts of appeal are thus unlikely to 
find the normal deprivations of discovery to be “really extraordinary.”  
The lack of review of interlocutory discovery orders perhaps helps in 
understanding why the majority in Twombly found dismissal to be the 
appropriate baseline for Mathews analysis. In reviewing the dismissal of 
a case, appellate courts can review the constitutionality of the 
deprivations potentially worked by the entire range of discovery likely 
to bear on the case.  
G.  Form 9 
An analysis of the majority’s and the dissent’s application of 
Mathews explains why the majority in Twombly was so easily able to 
reaffirm the validity of one of the factually simplest sample forms 
provided with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.223 This form—
which was numbered Form 9 when Twombly came down but has since 
been renumbered Form 11—provides a model for filing suit for medical 
expenses from a car accident.224 This form is a mere four sentences 
                                                                                                                     
(2d ed. 1992). 
 222. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quoting Ex parte 
Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259–60 (1947) (cautioning that mandamus is a “drastic and extraordinary” 
remedy “reserved for really extraordinary causes”)). Appellate courts rarely issue mandamus 
regarding discovery that is burdensome in terms of time and expenditures, unless some greater 
interest is at stake, such as attorney-client privilege or separation of powers. Se  id at 371 
(noting “[s]pecial considerations applicable to the President and the Vice President”); id. at 369 
(referring to “ordinary discovery orders where interlocutory appellate review is unavailable, 
through mandamus or otherwise”). See generally 16 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3935.3, 618 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing mandamus use in discovery 
context, where it “has been used as a tool of nearly-last resort,” often to protect against 
discovery of privileged information). 
 223. FED. R. CIV . P. Form 11 (2007). 
 224. Id. This model form states in full: 
1. (Statement of Jurisdiction—See Form 7.)  
2. On date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle 
against the plaintiff.  
3. As a result, the plaintiff was physically injured, lost wages or income, 
suffered physical and mental pain, and incurred medical expenses of 
$_______.  
Therefore, the plaintiff demands judgment against the defendant for 
$_______, plus costs. 
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long, and allows a plaintiff to file suit under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure claiming no more than the time and place of the accident, 
alleging negligence, and claiming damages.225  
Justice Stevens’ dissent claimed that this form showed how the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplated very little in the way of 
factual allegations in a complaint.226 Justice Stevens noted that in prior 
decisions the Supreme Court had used Form 9 “as an example of ‘the 
simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate,’”227 in 
opposition to the detailed factual allegations he claimed the majority 
opinion would now require from plaintiffs.228  
The Twombly majority countered that Form 9 provides much greater 
detail on the underlying claim than was provided by the Twombly 
plaintiffs: “A defendant wishing to prepare an answer in the simple fact 
pattern laid out in Form 9 would know what to answer; a defendant 
seeking to respond to [Twombly’s] conclusory allegations in the 
[Sherman Act] § 1 context would have little idea where to begin.”229 
The Court’s reasoning goes directly to Mathews factor (1), the private 
interest that might be deprived, as a Form 9 complaint would require 
significantly less in discovery costs, both monetary and time-wise.230 
Therefore, viewing Twombly as an extension of the Mathews balancing 
test to discovery explains how the majority could reaffirm the 
continuing validity of Form 9.  
H.  Making Sense of Recent Dismissal Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court’s recent dismissal jurisprudence becomes much 
more coherent by viewing Twombly as applying the Mathews test to the 
deprivations worked by discovery.  
1.  Erickson v. Pardus 
Just two weeks after deciding Twombly, the Supreme Court decided 
                                                                                                                     
Id. This form was renumbered in late 2007, so at the time of the Twombly decision, it was 
known as Form 9. See id.  
 225. Id. 
 226. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 575–76 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“The pleading paradigm under the new Federal Rules was well illustrated by the inclusion in 
the appendix of Form 9 . . . .”). 
 227. Id. at 576. 
 228. Id.  
 229. Id. at 565 n.10 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).  
 230. Implicit in the Twombly majority’s analysis of Form 11 was likely also the 
presumption that Mathews factors (2) and (3) assumed more normal values than in Twombly’s 
complaint. Specifically, there is no unusual risk of erroneous deprivation in automobile accident 
cases, as the threat of massive discovery costs are unlikely to lead to premature settlements. Cf. 
id. at 557–59. Automobile accident cases also typically have a good chance of success. Cf. id. at
565 n.10. 
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another case reviewing a grant of a motion to dismiss: Erickson v. 
Pardus,231 which was decided per curiam. William Erickson was a 
prisoner in a Colorado state prison and filed a pro se suit against prison 
officials, alleging that they had wrongly terminated his liver treatment 
despite his hepatitis C, thereby endangering his life in violation of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.232 The district court granted the 
prison officials’ motion to dismiss, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, 
finding Erickson’s allegations to be “conclusory.”233  
But the Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit’s judgment and 
remanded, finding that the lower courts had completely disregarded the 
liberal requirements of notice pleading.234 Although Twombly expressly 
retired Conley’s “no set of facts” language, the Court in Erickson 
quoted from a portion of Twombly that was, in turn, quoting from a 
different portion of Conley.235 The quoted language from Conley 
discussed the requirement that the complaint need only “give the 
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 
which it rests.”236 The Court found that Erickson’s complaint easily met 
this requirement, particularly given that he filed the complaint pro se.237  
Not surprisingly, Erickson thus generated substantial confusion 
among scholars and the lower courts about the meaning of Tw mbly.238 
It could be argued that the only firm conclusion one can draw from 
Erickson is that Twombly has not entirely overruled Conley or 
completely revolutionized the pleading standards.239  
But an understanding of Twombly as an application of the Mathews 
three-factor test to discovery easily explains the distinction between 
Twombly and Erickson. The prison officials’ private interest in avoiding 
discovery, Mathews factor (1) in determining whether to dismiss the 
complaint, was likely quite small given the fairly concrete allegations of 
harm, which could be determined with very little discovery. And while 
the Supreme Court noted that there was some risk of erroneous 
deprivation,240 Mathews factor (2), it was not unusually large. On the 
                                                                                                                     
 231. 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam).  
 232. Id. at 89–90.  
 233. Id. at 90 (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 198 F. App’x 694, 698 (10th Cir. 2006)).  
 234. Id. at 94.  
 235. Id. at 93. 
 236. Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).  
 237. Id. at 94. 
 238. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that Erickson was one of 
the “conflicting signals creat[ing] some uncertainty as to the intended scope of the Court’s 
decision” in Twombly).  
 239. McMahon, supra note 6, at 861 (“Perhaps Erickson simply means that Twombly’s 
‘plausibility’ standard, like all pleading standards, is to be applied less stringently to pro se 
plaintiffs.”).  
 240. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 91–93 (“It may in the final analysis be shown that the District 
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other hand, prisoner Erickson’s interest, factor (3), was quite 
substantial, as there was a possibility that he could die without his liver 
treatment.241 Under a Mathews analysis, it was clear that the defendant 
prison officials did not deserve the alternative procedure of dismissal as 
an alternative to discovery and summary judgment.242  
2.  Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. 
The Supreme Court’s dismissal jurisprudence prior to Twombly 
presaged the move toward analysis of motions to dismiss under the 
Mathews three-part test. For example, in the 2002 case, Swierkiewicz v. 
Sorema N.A.,243 the Court addressed what was required in an 
employment discrimination complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.244 
The unanimous Swierkiewicz Court held that no heightened pleading 
was required.245 As a result, many lower courts have interpreted 
Twombly as overruling Swierkiewicz at least in part.246 But this 
interpretation seems highly implausible, given that just five years 
separated the two cases; that Twombly’s author joined the Swierkiewicz 
opinion;247 that Swierkiewicz’s author joined the Twombly majority;248 
and that five of the seven Justices on the Court for both cases joined 
both opinions.249  
Rather, Swierkiewicz is entirely consistent with Twombly when 
Twombly is understood as an application of the Mathews test to 
discovery. As noted earlier, Mathews is used to compare alternative 
procedures against a baseline, and in determining how to handle a 
motion to dismiss, the relevant baseline is discovery, summary 
judgment, and other pretrial procedures for determining the merits of a 
                                                                                                                     
Court was correct to grant respondents’ motion to dismiss. That is not the issue here, 
however.”).  
 241. Id. at 94 (“The complaint stated that Dr. Bloor’s decision to remove petitioner from 
his prescribed hepatitis C medication was ‘endangering [his] life.’”).  
 242. Id. 
 243. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).  
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See, e.g., Hughes v. Colo. Dep’t of Corrs., 594 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1240 (D. Colo. 
2009); Harley v. Paulson, No. 07-3559, 2008 WL 5189931, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2008); Kamar 
v. Krolczyk, No. 1:07-CV-0340 AWI TAG, 2008 WL 4427264, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 
2008); Premier Pork L.L.C. v. Westin, Inc., No. 07-1661, 2008 WL 724352, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 
17, 2008); Aztec Energy Partners, Inc. v. Sensor Switch, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 226, 228 (D. 
Conn. 2007).  
 247. Justice Souter, the author of Twombly, joined in Swierkiewicz.  
 248. Justice Thomas, the author of Swierkiewicz, joined in Twombly.  
 249. These five Justices are Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Souter, and Breyer. It 
appears likely that at least one of the two Justices to join the Court between S i rkiewicz and 
Twombly, Chief Justice Roberts, would have joined in both. Notably, in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 
199, 224 (2007), Roberts reaffirmed the pleading standard of Swierkiewicz.  
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claim. The Swierkiewicz Court evinced a view of this baseline in the 
employment discrimination context quite different from the Twombly 
Court’s understanding in the antitrust context, noting that “the 
provisions for pretrial procedure and summary judgment [are] so 
effective, that attempted surprise in federal practice is aborted very 
easily, synthetic issues detected, and the gravamen of the dispute 
brought frankly into the open for the inspection of the court.”250 In 
short, the different views of the baseline meant that M thews factors (1) 
and (2) weighed much more in the plaintiff’s favor in Swierkiewicz than 
in Twombly.  
Factor (3) in the Mathews test also likely played a significant role in 
the different results in Swierkiewicz and Twombly. Recall that in 
litigation between private parties, factor (3) is primarily the adverse 
party’s interest, but “with, nonetheless, due regard for any ancillary 
interest the government may have.”251 Moreover, the Court has 
steadfastly recognized a very powerful government interest in ending 
discrimination.252 Given that all three Mathews factors had different 
weights in Swierkiewicz than in Twombly, these cases may be easily 
harmonized.  
3.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal 
In May 2009, a sharply-divided 5–4 Supreme Court decided Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal,253 the latest Supreme Court case to address pleading standards. 
The plaintiff in that case, Javaid Iqbal, was a Pakistani Muslim who was 
detained in a Brooklyn detention facility and harshly treated after the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.254 He brought suit alleging 
unconstitutional treatment against his jailors and a number of officials, 
including former attorney general John Ashcroft and FBI director 
Robert Mueller, whom Iqbal accused of creating the policies that led to 
his harsh detention.255 The Second Circuit found the complaint 
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss after Twombly,256 but the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari with respect to Ashcroft and Mueller 
and reversed.257 Most of the opinion focused on determining the 
                                                                                                                     
 250. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513 (quoting from 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT &  ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202, 98 (3d ed. 2004)).  
 251. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991). See also supra text accompanying notes 
185–95. 
 252. See, e.g., Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 129 S. Ct. 846, 
852–53 (2009). 
 253. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).  
 254. Id. at 1942–45.  
 255. Id. at 1944.  
 256. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007).  
 257. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1945.  
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existence of subject matter jurisdiction258 and on rejecting—entirely—
the existence of supervisory liability of federal officials in Bivens 
suits.259 The Court also rejected, however, Iqbal’s claims against 
Ashcroft and Mueller under the Twombly standard, finding that Iqbal 
had “not ‘nudged [his] claims’ of invidious discrimination ‘across the 
line from conceivable to plausible.’”260  
Unfortunately Iqbal did not clarify the meaning of “plausibility” or 
the content of the Twombly standard. While the Court did confirm that 
Twombly applied to all civil cases in federal court,261 it provided no new 
guidance to lower courts on Twombly’s content. And while the Court 
clarified that lower courts must sort out factual allegations from legal 
conclusions before applying the “plausibility” standard,262 it did not 
clarify the meaning of “plausibility” itself.263  
But the Court did affirm and amplify the importance of the three 
factors relevant to a Mathews analysis. Regarding Mathews factor (1), 
in this case the interests of the defendants, the Court made very clear 
that Twombly was motivated by a concern to protect defendants from 
the “burdens of discovery.”264 Twombly’s pleading standards, the Court 
stated, do “not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with 
nothing more than conclusions.”265 The Court recognized that discovery 
results in the “expenditure of valuable time and resources.”266  
Regarding factor (2), the “risk of erroneous deprivation” of the 
defendants’ time and resources, the Court made clear that the risk of 
erroneously unlocking the doors to discovery is central to the Twombly 
analysis.267 The Court explained Twombly as justified by the fact that 
the complaint in that case “was more likely explained by, lawful, 
unchoreographed free-market behavior.”268 In rejecting the sufficiency 
                                                                                                                     
 258. Id. at 1945–47.  
 259. Id. at 1947–49. The dissent took the majority to task for its rejection of Bivens 
supervisory liability as being not necessary to the case, not properly briefed, and probably not 
the correct outcome. Id. at 1955–58 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 260. Id. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  
 261. Id. at 1953.  
 262. Id. at 1949–50.  
 263. Once again, as in Twombly, the majority and the dissent disagreed on the underlying 
baseline procedure. Id. at 1961–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer in dissent argued for 
the alternative procedure of minimal, well-structured discovery. Id. (All the dissenters advocated 
this alternative by arguing for affirmance of the Second Circuit’s opinion, which expressly 
advocated “structure[d] . . . limited discovery.” Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2d Cir. 
2007)). But the Court expressly rejected this alternative in Subsection IV.C.2 of its opinion. 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953–54 (majority opinion).  
 264. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.  
 265. Id. at 1950.  
 266. Id. at 1953 (emphasis added).  
 267. Id. at 1950. 
 268. Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 (2007)) (emphasis 
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of the factual allegations in Iqbal’s complaint, the Court stated “given 
more likely explanations, they do not plausibly establish this 
purpose.”269 The Court also noted that “the arrests Mueller oversaw 
were likely lawful and justified.”270 Thus the risk of erroneous 
deprivation by discovery into a meritless claim is identical to the 
likelihood of other explanations being correct.  
The likelihood of alternative explanations also goes to the 
adversary’s interest portion of Mathews factor (3), specifically the 
interest of Iqbal in recovery, as measured by the possibility of recovery 
discounted by the likelihood that the claim would not entitle Iqbal to 
relief. Given the Court’s conclusion that Iqbal would most likely not be 
entitled to recovery against Ashcroft and Mueller,271 it necessarily 
follows that Mathews factor (3) was relatively insignificant.  
But Mathews factor (3), as adapted to the litigation context, is not 
solely the adverse litigant’s interest, as it also includes “due regard for 
any ancillary interest the government may have in providing the 
procedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater 
protections.”272 The Court extensively considered the government’s 
interest in dismissing the complaint,273 noting that allowing discovery 
against high-level government officials would burden and distract them 
from “vigorous performance of their duties.”274  
I.  Context and Flexibility 
Mathews and Twombly share another trait: They both set out a 
flexible, standards-based test for lower courts to use. In both cases, the 
Court significantly modified prior, inflexible, rule-based precedent: 
Mathews modified Goldberg v. Kelly’s hard-and-fast requirement of a 
pre-deprivation hearing for benefits termination,275 and Twombly 
repudiated Conley’s “no set of facts” language.276  
                                                                                                                     
added).  
 269. Id. at 1951 (emphasis added).  
 270. Id. (emphasis added). 
 271. Id. 
 272. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991) (emphasis added). In Doehr, the 
government’s interest weighed—albeit very lightly—in favor of not providing the alternative 
procedure. But this language regarding factor (3) makes clear that the government’s interest can 
either increase or decrease the weight of factor (3) in the analysis, as the government may have 
an interest in “providing . . . or forgoing” the procedure. In Iqbal, the government’s interest was 
in “providing” the alternative procedure of dismissal. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953–54. 
 273. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953–54. 
 274. Id. at 1954.  
 275. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“In only one case, Goldberg v. 
Kelly . . . has the Court held that a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial is necessary.”) 
(internal citations omitted).  
 276. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562–63 (2007) (retiring language from 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957)).  
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The Court in Mathews observed that “‘due process,’ unlike some 
legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated 
to time, place and circumstances,”277 but is rather “flexible and calls for 
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”278 
Both Mathews and its progeny have focused on the importance of 
“context.”279  
Similarly in Twombly, the Court emphasized the importance of 
“context” when evaluating the plausibility of a complaint.280 The Court 
explicitly stated that it was describing a standard, referring to “the 
plausibility standard.”281 The Court contrasted that language with 
Conley, in which it had set forth a “rule.”282 The Court’s word choice 
showed that it recognized that it was describing a standard in place of a 
rule.  
Both Twombly and Mathews, moreover, mandate a reasonableness 
inquiry. As noted earlier,283 the Mathews test, as a variant of Judge 
Hand’s three-factor negligence test, requires simply that agencies and 
courts provide reasonable procedural safeguards.284 Meanwhile, the 
Twombly Court stated that its new plausibility standard merely “calls for 
enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal 
evidence of illegal agreement.”285 In both, reasonableness is determined 
by balancing the three factors. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS 
This Part considers the potential implications of understanding 
Twombly as an extension of the Mathews test to prevent discovery from 
violating due process. While some of these implications are positive and 
                                                                                                                     
 277. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. 
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)). 
 278. Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). 
 279. Id. at 344–45 (“The potential value of an evidentiary hearing, or even oral 
presentation to the decisionmaker, is substantially less in this context than in Goldberg.”) (first 
emphasis added); id. at 330, 331 n.11, 334, 340, 345 (engaging in additional discussion of 
context); see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 225 (2005) (“The private interest at stake 
here, while more than minimal, must be evaluated, nonetheless, within the context of the prison 
system and its attendant curtailment of liberties.”) (emphasis added); i . at 224, 227 (providing 
additional references to context).  
 280. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548–49, 557, 561–62, 565 n.10. 
 281. Id. at 560. 
 282. Id. at 561 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (noting “the accepted 
rule”)).  
 283. See supra Part III.D. 
 284. See Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 659 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Mathews as a guide 
for determining whether a procedural requirement is reasonable).  
 285. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added); see also id. at 559 (“[R]easonably 
founded hope that the discovery process will reveal relevant evidence.”) (internal citations 
omitted); id. at 562 (noting “reasonably founded hope” was necessary). 
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quite sensible, others are more ambiguous. This Part also concludes that 
Twombly necessarily has constitutional scope, being more than merely 
an interpretation of the Federal Rules. 
A.  Clarity and Institutional Competence 
As noted earlier in this Article, Twombly has generated great 
uncertainty for litigants, the lower courts, and commentators.286 Courts 
do not know how to apply Twombly or even the meaning of 
“plausibility.”287  
This Article provides a concrete answer that allows courts evaluating 
motions to dismiss to draw on the deep well of precedent employing the 
Mathews balancing test. The three Mathews factors can be analyzed in 
the context of discovery as a way to give content to Tw mbly’s vague 
terms of “plausibility”288 and “reasonable expectation that discovery 
will reveal evidence.”289  
Evaluating these three factors is within the institutional competence 
of the federal district courts. The Court in the recent case of Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal appears to agree, stating that “[d]etermining whether a complaint 
states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that 
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 
common sense.”290  
Mathews factor (1) as applied to discovery is the property interest in 
the money spent on discovery, plus the liberty taken away by 
depositions.291 District courts supervise discovery,292 meaning that 
district and magistrate judges by necessity become experts on the scope 
and cost of discovery in different types of cases.293 Indeed, district and 
magistrate judges themselves have discretion over how much discovery 
to allow, and their own policies and practices thus contribute to factor 
(1).  
Factor (2) in Mathews, the risk of erroneous deprivation, is directly 
                                                                                                                     
 286. See supra notes 6, 12 and accompanying text.  
 287. See Robbins v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs., 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th 
Cir. 2008) (“The most difficult question in interpreting Twombly is what the Court means by 
‘plausibility.’”); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 
the confusion surrounding the “new ‘plausibility’ paradigm”). 
 288. The Twombly majority opinion used the word “plausible” or a close variant eighteen 
times. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.  
 289. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (discussing “reasonable 
expectation”).  
 290. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (emphasis added).  
 291. See supra Part IV.A. 
 292. See FED. R. CIV . P. 26. 
 293. District courts also address the costs of discovery by exercising their discretion to 
award sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, further developing their intuition on 
such matters.  
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tied to the propensity of the suit to be pursued abusively. As Judge 
Easterbrook notes, district courts are ill-positioned to detect and remedy 
discovery abuse before it occurs.294 But courts, as repeat observers, are 
in the best position to determine the types of complaints that tend to 
result in abusive discovery. Most importantly, district courts can 
evaluate whether the complaint has sufficient factual allegations to give 
the complaint the “heft” required by Twombly.295 Doubtless courts’ 
“judicial experience”296 will contribute to this analysis. 
Finally, Mathews factor (3) in this context is the adverse party’s 
likely interest in proceeding to discovery, as well as the court’s own 
burden in allowing the case to proceed. Needless to say, district courts 
are ideally positioned to evaluate the burden they themselves will avoid 
by granting a motion to dismiss. The adverse party’s likely interest, like 
factor (2), is informed by the district or magistrate judge’s “judicial 
experience”297 of seeing the dispositions of similar cases, particularly 
the monetary recovery that plaintiffs can expect to receive if the case 
turns out to have merit. So factor (3), like the other two Mathews 
factors, is very well entrusted to the federal judiciary. 
B.  Dismissal Still Tests Legal Sufficiency 
Understanding dismissal as incorporating the Mathews balancing test 
by no means diminishes the traditional role of dismissal as a 
determination of whether the law allows recompense for the wrong 
alleged. Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure’s version of the traditional demurrer,298 
whereby courts test whether the complaint’s legal theory is 
cognizable.299  
When a complaint fails to state any valid legal theory upon which 
relief is sought, the plaintiff obviously has no interest at all in 
proceeding to discovery, corresponding to a value of zero for factor 
                                                                                                                     
 294. Easterbrook, supra note 172, at 639 (“How can a judge distinguish a dry hole 
(common in litigation as well as in the oil business) from a request that was not justified at the 
time?”).  
 295. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).  
 296. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).  
 297. Id.  
 298. For enunciation of this principle, see the advisory committee’s note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12 (“Rule 12(b)(6), permitting a motion to dismiss for failure of the complaint to state a claim 
on which relief can be granted, is substantially the same as the old demurrer for failure of a 
pleading to state a cause of action.”). 
 299. Several jurisdictions, such as California, retain the demurrer and its traditional 
understandings. See Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd., 201 P.3d 472, 476–77 (Cal. 2009) 
(noting that courts “may affirm the sustaining of a demurrer only if the complaint fails to state a 
cause of action under any possible legal theory”) (emphasis added). 
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(3).300 Moreover, when the complaint does not state any valid legal 
theory, discovery would be used to find facts despite a certainty of 
failure at summary judgment, corresponding to a value of 100% for 
factor (2).301 And factor (1), the cost of discovery to the defendant, will 
always be nontrivial. Thus, when balancing factors (1) and (2), which 
are non-trivial and 100%, respectively, against factor (3), which is zero, 
the Mathews test will always mandate dismissing a complaint with no 
legal sufficiency.302  
Thus, understanding the new Twombly standard for dismissal as the 
Mathews test applied to discovery, does not at all foreclose the 
traditional role of the motion to dismiss in determining whether the 
complaint states a valid legal theory. Whenever the complaint fails to 
state a valid legal theory, the Mathews te t unambiguously mandates use 
of dismissal instead of allowing discovery.  
C.  No Discovery Plus Summary Judgment 
The prospect of allowing district courts to dismiss a complaint based 
on grounds other than pure legal insufficiency may trouble some 
observers, despite evidence that lower courts have long used motions to 
dismiss for many reasons other than lack of legal sufficiency,303 and 
despite the Twombly Court’s retirement of Conley’s “no set of facts” 
rule. A simple thought experiment, however, shows the unexceptional 
nature of granting motions to dismiss for reasons other than pure legal 
insufficiency.  
Suppose hypothetically that the district court wherein Twombly was 
originally filed had not dismissed the complaint, but instead had 
allowed no discovery and then granted summary judgment to the 
defendants.304 In all practical terms, the results would be the same: No 
discovery would occur; the facts presented by the plaintiffs in their 
                                                                                                                     
 300. See supra note 129. Recall that the alternative procedure is required under the 
Mathews test when the following inequality is true: P x V > C. In this equation, factor (3) is C, 
which in turn is “the interest of the party seeking [discovery], with, nonetheless, due regard for 
any ancillary interest the government may have.” Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991). 
If the complaint fails under any legal theory, then the party has zero interest, and the 
government’s only interest, if any, is to avoid any additional process. Thus, C is either zero or 
even negative.  
 301. This is the same analysis as in the previous note, with the additional information that 
V is 100%.  
 302. It is clear that the inequality P x V > C will always be satisfied, as it will be P x 100% 
> 0. (The variable P will always be a positive number as discovery always imposes some 
costs.).  
 303. See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 574–82 
(2003); see also Matthew A. Josephson, Note, Some Things are Better Left Said: Pleading 
Practice After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 42 GA. L. REV. 867, 878–81 (2008).  
 304. See FED. R. CIV . P. 56.  
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complaint would be the only basis for keeping the case in court; and 
these facts would have been viewed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiffs, who were the nonmovants.305  
Had the district court done this, the Second Circuit and Supreme 
Court would have reviewed the denial of discovery for abuse of 
discretion,306 a very deferential standard. But the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure allow discovery limitations, presumably to the point of zero 
discovery, if “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the 
amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the 
issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in 
resolving the issues.”307 In Twombly, the Court found the expense of the 
proposed discovery to be excessive, particularly given the extremely 
thin facts alleged in the complaint. As a result, if the district court in 
Twombly had simply allowed no discovery and granted summary 
judgment, then appellate courts would likely have found that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion.  
This hypothetical example demonstrates how dismissal is effectively 
just the denial of discovery, followed by summary judgment based 
solely on the facts alleged in the complaint. Indeed, the courts of appeal 
often wrestle with how to determine whether a district court’s 
disposition of a case was a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), or summary judgment under Rule 56.308 And 
anecdotally, plaintiffs increasingly attach numerous and lengthy 
exhibits to complaints, making them resemble more closely oppositions 
to summary judgment.  
The outcome in Twombly, in which the Court dismissed the 
complaint despite the well-established validity of legal liability for 
                                                                                                                     
 305. In evaluating either motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment, courts must 
take all the facts before them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Compare Scott v. 
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (“[C]ourts are required to view the facts and draw reasonable 
inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion.”) 
(internal punctuation omitted), with Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 406 (2002) (“Since 
we are reviewing a ruling on motion to dismiss, we accept [plaintiff’s] factual allegations and 
take them in the light most favorable to her.”).  
 306. The district court’s management of discovery is reviewed for abuse of discretion. S e 
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706–07 (1997); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 482 
(1996). This results both from the equitable origins of discovery in chancery procedure and from 
the plain language of the relevant provisions. See FED. R. CIV . P. 26(b) (repeatedly stating that 
the court “may” take certain actions to manage discovery); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity 
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 
U. PA. L. REV. 909, 919 (1987) (discussing the chancery origins of discovery).  
 307. FED. R. CIV . P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).  
 308. See, e.g., Rosenblum v. Travelbyus.com Ltd., 299 F.3d 657, 661–62 (7th Cir. 2002); 
Finley Lines Joint Protective Bd. Unit 200 v. Norfolk S. Corp., 109 F.3d 993, 996 (4th Cir. 
1997). 
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anticompetitive conspiracies, makes more sense through this view of 
dismissal as denial of discovery plus summary judgment. This broader 
scope for dismissal post-Twombly also makes it easier to understand 
Twombly as the Mathews test applied in order to avoid deprivations 
worked by discovery. Using dismissal to avoid undue deprivations on 
parties and the court, as well as to weed out legally-insufficient 
complaints, is entirely consistent with application of the Mathews 
test.309  
D.  Subjectivity & Uncertainty 
Understanding Twombly as Mathews applied to discovery allows 
federal courts to bring to bear the familiar three-factor Mathews 
analysis, where evaluating the factors is squarely within courts’ 
institutional competency. But it also brings with it the problems of 
subjectivity and uncertainty that scholars have long noted come with 
any evaluation of Mathews factors in any context.310 For example, 
regarding Mathews factor (1), judges use different metrics in measuring 
the magnitude of property or liberty interests, and would split over 
which of the following property interests is more valuable: a 
corporation’s right to receive $10 million a month in interest or an 
impoverished widow’s right to her monthly $200 pension check.311  
Just as the Mathews factors invite subjectivity, so too does the new 
Twombly pleading standard. For example, regarding factor (1), judges 
might split on whether to accord different treatment to discovery that 
would cost $10 million for a multinational corporation, versus discovery 
that would cost $100,000 for a small business. Moreover, in evaluating 
factor (3) in an employment discrimination claim, for example, courts 
might differ on whether to weigh only the plaintiff’s likely monetary 
                                                                                                                     
 309. Given this understanding of dismissal as the denial of discovery plus summary 
judgment, the standard of appellate review of dismissals should not change from its current de 
novo review. See, e.g., Kane Enters. v. MacGregor (USA) Inc., 322 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 
2003) (reviewing a motion to dismiss de novo); Madison v. Graham, 316 F.3d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 
2002); McKusick v. City of Melbourne, 96 F.3d 478, 482 (11th Cir. 1996); Bower v. Fed. 
Express Corp., 96 F.3d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1996). A district court’s application of the Mathews 
test is reviewed de novo on appeal. See, e.g., Dipeppe v. Quarantillo, 337 F.3d 326, 332 (3d Cir. 
2003); Willamette Waterfront, Ltd. v. Victoria Station Inc. (In re Victoria Station Inc.), 875 
F.2d 1380, 1382 (9th Cir. 1989). Of course, any factual determinations made by the district 
court, such as the expense and cost of discovery required for a particular case, would doubtless 
be reviewed for clear error. Cf. McGuire v. United States, 550 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(noting that legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, whereas factual findings are reviewed for 
clear error).  
 310. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative 
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 28, 39 (1976) (criticizing the Mathews Court’s approach to evaluating the factors as 
being “subjective and impressionistic”); see also Pierce, supra note 129, at 282.  
 311. This example is partially borrowed from Pierce, supra note 129, at 282.  
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recovery, or to also include the interests of the plaintiff and the 
government in fighting the injustice of discrimination.  
Two recent empirical studies have found that the problem of 
subjectivity is already arising, albeit for unclear reasons, as district 
courts post-Twombly have increasingly granted motions to dismiss in 
civil rights and discrimination cases.312 One study conducted months 
after Twombly was decided found that district courts have not 
significantly increased the rate of dismissals as a result of Tw mbly—
except in civil rights cases, such as those brought under § 1983, for 
which dismissal rates have seen statistically significant increases.313 A 
second, more recent study, focusing on Title VII cases, found that 
federal district courts have been wielding Twombly to dismiss 
employment discrimination cases at a higher rate than pre-Twombly.314 
These trends are troubling.  
In effect, many lower courts apparently interpret315 Twombly to have 
overruled the Supreme Court’s cases restating the relative ease with 
which civil rights or employment discrimination plaintiffs may survive 
a motion to dismiss: Swierkiewicz,316 which involved employment 
discrimination; and Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics 
Intelligence & Coordination Unit,317 involving a § 1983 civil rights 
claim.  
But Twombly, Swierkiewicz,318 and Leatherman are all reconcilable 
when understood as applying the Mathews three-factor test to discovery. 
In discrimination or civil rights cases, which are often factually 
straightforward,319 the deprivation worked on defendants by discovery 
is relatively small, meaning a small Mathews factor (1). Meanwhile, in 
such cases, factor (2), the likelihood of erroneous deprivation from 
discovery, is also small. In Swierkiewicz, the Court called “the 
                                                                                                                     
 312. See infra notes 313–14 and accompanying text. 
 313. Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact ofBell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1815 (2008). 
This study defined civil rights cases as those brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 
1985, as well as Bivens actions and generalized claims of due process or equal protection 
violations. Id. at 1836 n.161. This definition did not include suits under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, or the Americans with 
Disabilities Act. Id.  
 314. Seiner, supra note 12, at 1026–35.  
 315. See supra note 246 (listing examples of courts viewing Twombly as overruling, at least 
in part, Swierkiewicz).  
 316. 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
 317. 507 U.S. 163 (1993). 
 318. This Article has already touched on the reconciliation of Swierkiewicz and Twombly. 
See supra Part IV.H.2. 
 319. See Seiner, supra note 12, at 1021 (“[M]ost employment discrimination claims are 
relatively straightforward and revolve around battles over intent and causation,” and are “at the 
complete opposite end of the spectrum” from Twombly).  
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provisions for pretrial . . . procedure and summary judgment so 
effective”320 in weeding out unmeritorious claims as to establish a 
reliable baseline procedure. Indeed, empirical data show that summary 
judgment effectively disposes of many invalid discrimination claims.321 
Finally, factor (3) is substantial, especially given the government’s well-
established and strong interest in stamping out discrimination and civil 
rights abuses.  
That Twombly simply extended the three-factor Mathews test to 
discovery explains some of the subjective evaluations introduced into 
certain types of dismissals, including employment discrimination. But 
this insight can also provide courts with a familiar framework for 
analyzing motions to dismiss, giving content to the “plausibility” 
standard and thus aiding the process of reestablishing uniform pleading 
standards throughout the federal court system.322  
E.  International Perspective 
While the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has increasingly extended 
the Mathews test to all areas of procedure,323 the Court has also 
increasingly cited foreign law and precedent for support, often in cases 
where U.S. law diverges from other countries’ laws.324 This trend has 
certainly had its fair share of detractors,325 yet it may help to explain 
why the Twombly opinion garnered the unqualified votes of several 
Justices not otherwise known for favoring defendants in civil actions.  
The U.S. system of discovery is unique in scope and in the tools it 
makes available to attorneys.326 Even other common law countries 
                                                                                                                     
 320. 534 U.S. at 512–13; accord Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168–69 (“[F]ederal courts and 
litigants must rely on summary judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious 
claims sooner rather than later.”).  
 321. See Seiner, supra note 12, at 1032–35.  
 322. As discussed earlier, the recent Iqbal case contributed little or nothing to 
understanding the meaning of “plausibility.” See discussion supra Part IV.H.3. But the Court 
unwittingly highlighted the problems of subjectivity in the plausibility standard, stating that 
“[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-
specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 
sense.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (emphasis added). Experience and common sense 
inherently invite a subjective analysis.  
 323. See supra Part III.B. 
 324. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005). 
 325. See, e.g., id. at 627–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 322 
(2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Steven G. Calabresi, “A Shining City on a Hill”: American 
Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 
1335, 1337–38 (2006).  
 326. See Edward F. Sherman, Transnational Perspectives Regarding the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 510, 517–18 (2006); Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery In 
Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 299, 300 (2002); see also Societe 
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 
549 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). See generally Hague Convention on the 
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abhor American-style discovery, with its intrusive depositions and 
massive production requests.327 Despite a much narrower starting point 
for discovery, the courts of the United Kingdom have moved even 
further away from the American model in the past decade.328 In this 
context, Twombly may be viewed partly as the Court recognizing what 
other nations have long understood: Discovery can easily turn into an 
intrusive deprivation of money and individuals’ time. Accordingly, such 
interests would deserve protection under notions of procedural due 
process, which the Supreme Court effectuates through the Mathews test.  
F.  Constitutional or Statutory?  
Mathews is, of course, a constitutional decision about the minimum 
requirements imposed by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.329 If this Article’s hypothesis is correct, and 
Twombly is best understood as Mathews applied to discovery, then 
Twombly itself has constitutional scope, with ramifications well beyond 
just the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
One can argue, of course, that Twombly is to be read solely as a 
construction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme 
Court is the final interpretative arbiter of both the Due Process Clauses 
and of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part that the Rules “should be 
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.”330 The same notions lie 
behind both procedural due process and “just, speedy, and inexpensive” 
resolution of proceedings. Twombly could be read as simply deploying 
the Mathews factors to further these statutorily-mandated goals.  
But a violation of Mathews violates the Constitution, and subsequent 
cases will likely reveal Twombly to be the Court’s initial step toward 
applying Mathew’s procedural safeguards to discovery. The Court has a 
long-standing preference for resolving cases through statutory 
interpretation whenever possible, rather than resorting to constitutional 
law.331 In Twombly, the Court may indeed have focused on the Federal 
                                                                                                                     
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 
847 U.N.T.S. 231 (facilitating the exchange of letters of request between nations).  
 327. See Sherman, supra note 326, at 517; Subrin, supra note 326, at 304, 306–07; Hooker 
Corp. v. Australia (1985) 80 F.L.R. 94, 104 (Austl.); see also Lord Advocate, Petitioner, 1998 
S.L.T. 835, 839 (Oct. 10, 1997) (“In the United States the courts permitted wide ranging pre-
trial discovery but this procedure was not allowed in the United Kingdom. The courts in 
England and Scotland . . . would not countenance ‘fishing’ expeditions.”). 
 328. Subrin, supra note 326, at 304–05.  
 329. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.  
 330. FED. R. CIV . P. 1 (emphasis added).  
 331. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343–
40
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Rules in order to avoid expressly determining the point at which 
discovery abuse becomes a procedural due process violation.332 Such 
judicial restraint is sensible and entirely consistent with the Roberts 
Court’s incrementalist approach to judging.  
Future cases should squarely present the Court with the underlying 
constitutional question. The most likely type of case to do so would be a 
case granted certiorari from a state court system with a divergent 
standard for motions to dismiss.333 After all, the same minimum 
requirements of procedural due process that apply in the federal courts 
also apply in state courts.334 Other possible routes do exist, such as a 
case from a federal circuit court that adopts a reading of Tw mbly that 
insufficiently protects procedural due process. Or the Court could 
accept a garden-variety pleading case and simply state outright that 
Twombly was motivated by due process concerns.  
G.  Equity Practice in the Framers’ Era 
Arguing that Twombly applies notions of procedural due process to 
pleading standards invites an inquiry into whether Twombly conflicts 
with (or is supported by) the original intention335 of the Framers of the 
Fifth Amendment, which supplies the guarantee of due process relevant 
to the federal courts.336 In a closely-related vein, one must also ask 
whether this understanding of Twombly conflicts with the Seventh 
Amendment’s guarantee of trial by jury “[i]n Suits at common law.”337 
                                                                                                                     
44 (1999); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979); Murray v. 
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.).  
 332. The Twombly court noticeably did not expressly ground its new plausibility standard 
in the text of the rules or any other statute. The rules do not even mention “plausibility” or any 
variant. Indeed, time may reveal the new “plausibility” standard as being of constitutional scope.   
 333. Cf. Chen, supra note 7, at 1432 (discussing whether state courts should follow the lead 
of Twombly).  
 334. See Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1988); Hodge v. Muscatine 
County, 196 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1905).  
 335. This Article certainly does not argue that original intent is the only guide to 
understanding “due process,” let alone that it is the primary basis or justification for Twombly. 
Rather, this Part responds to potential original intent objections. Inasmuch as one believes that 
constitutional interpretation should be informed by other influences including evolving wisdom, 
experience, economic analysis, and foreign law, those also provide a solid foundation for 
Twombly. See, e.g., supra Part V.E. 
 336. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law”) (emphasis added). Of course, the Fourteenth Amendment contains 
an identical guarantee of due process applicable to state courts. Equity practice and discovery 
changed little between the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, so this same analysis would apply 
to state courts. The only notable change was the Field Code’s introduction of some very limited 
discovery procedures at law. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The 
Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 696 (1998); 
Subrin, supra note 306, at 937.  
 337. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
41
Blair-Stanek: Twombly is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v. Eldridge Test
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
42 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
To address these questions, one must look at equity practice in the time 
of the Framers, because at that time only equity provided for discovery.  
1.  Relation to the Seventh Amendment  
In England at the end of the eighteenth century, equity and the 
common law were entirely distinct bodies of law vested in different 
courts: the common law was administered in the various common law 
courts, and equity was administered in the chancery.338 This same 
distinction remained in the federal courts established in the United 
States by the Judiciary Act of 1789,339 with equity remaining a distinct 
practice from law in the federal courts until the merger of law and 
equity in 1938 with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.340 Indeed, from the inception of the federal courts, the equity 
practice of federal courts was adopted wholesale from English chancery 
practice.341  
As Blackstone makes clear, the common law courts were unable to 
provide discovery, which was available only through equity 
procedures.342 Indeed, the very idea of a subpoena originated in 
equity.343 Discovery was available in equity both to support a suit filed 
in equity and as a supplement to any action at common law.344 So, a 
litigant in the common law courts could go over to the chancery and 
request discovery in equity, and then use the evidence thus discovered 
in the common law courts.345 But the common law itself lacked 
                                                                                                                     
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a 
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the 
rules of the common law.”). The Seventh Amendment does not apply to the states.  
 338. See generally 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 30–60 (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press 1768) (explaining the different public courts of common law and equity). 
 339. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73; see also Process Act of September 29, 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93, 93–
94. The statutes passed by the first Congress are generally considered to be a good guide to the 
Framers’ intent both because of the close chronology and because many of the Framers were 
members of the first Congress.  
 340. RICHARD H. FALLON , JR. ET AL., HART &  WECHSLER’ S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 602–03 (5th ed. 2003). 
 341. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945); FALLON , supra note 340, at 
602–03. Note that “[s]tates in the early days [of the new republic] varied greatly in the manner 
in which equitable relief was afforded and in the extent to which it was available.” Guaranty 
Trust, 326 U.S. at 104. 
 342. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 338, at 51 (noting that the common law writs “might 
have effectually answered all the purposes of a court of equity; except that of obtaining a 
discovery”); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS 
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA §§ 1484–85, at 812–13 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 
Little, Brown & Co. 13th ed. 1886) (1835). 
 343. BLACKSTONE, supra note 338, at 52 (discussing the origin of the writ of subpoena).  
 344. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 338, at 437; STORY, supra note 342, § 1483, at 811–12.  
 345. BLACKSTONE, supra note 338, at 437.  
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discovery mechanisms of any kind.346 And this distinction continued in 
the United States for many decades after the founding. In 1835 to 1836, 
Justice Story’s Commentaries On Equity Jurisprudence, as 
Administered in England and America, referred to equity as having the 
“exclusive”347 ability to provide discovery, and thus, “[i]n a general 
sense Courts of Equity may be said to be assistant to other courts in a 
variety of cases.”348  
In this context, the irrelevance to discovery of the Seventh 
Amendment’s guarantee of jury trials in “[s]uits at common law” 
becomes clear.349 The Seventh Amendment preserves the right of 
litigants to have factual issues tried to juries—the same “right which 
existed under the English common law when the [a]mendment was 
adopted.”350 But the amendment does not guarantee a right to discovery 
into factual issues, as the common law undoubtedly did not even 
provide discovery mechanisms.351 In short, the Seventh Amendment 
guarantees a certain method for resolving factual disputes at trial (i.e., 
by jury), but cannot reasonably be interpreted to guarantee discovery 
into facts before trial. Now, after Twombly, as in the common law courts 
of the late eighteenth century, a plaintiff must come into court with at 
least the rudimentary facts supporting the claim and cannot rely on the 
power of the court to fish for facts to make a case.352 
2.  Modern Discovery Vastly Exceeds Founding-Era Equity 
Although modern discovery practice is rooted in equity practice, 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it goes well beyond 
anything recognizable in equity practice at the time of the founding. 
Indeed, the discovery provisions under the Rules go well beyond 
anything known before the Rules’ adoption in 1938. As Charles Clark, 
the “father”353 of the Rules stated of the discovery system found in the 
                                                                                                                     
 346. BLACKSTONE, supra note 338, at 437–38.  
 347. STORY, supra note 342, § 1480, at 810. Justice Story referred to the discovery function 
of equity as “the auxiliary or assistant jurisdiction which indeed is exclusive in its own nature, 
but being applied in aid of the remedial justice of other courts may well admit of a distinct 
consideration.” Id. (emphasis added).  
 348. STORY, supra note 342, § 1481, at 810.  
 349. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 350. Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935).  
 351. The Framers knew how to refer to equity—which was then separate from the law—
when they wanted to. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, 
in Law and Equity.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall 
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity.”).  
 352. The common law around the time of the founding hardly allowed every dispute to get 
to a jury, as plaintiffs had to pass the gauntlet of the writ system. S e generally WILLIAM S. 
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (7th ed. 1956) (discussing common law around the 
time of the founding and what was required to get before a jury).  
 353. Clark was the Reporter for the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, 
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Rules:  
It goes very much beyond English procedure, which does 
not provide for general depositions of parties or witnesses. 
And only sporadically was there to be found here and there 
a suggestion for some part of the proposed system, but 
nowhere the fusion of the whole to make a complete system 
such as we ultimately presented.354 
Furthermore, Edson Sunderland, who drafted the Rules’ discovery 
provisions, acknowledged that there was no precedent for the liberalized 
discovery he contemplated.355  
For example, the Rules vastly liberalized the use of oral depositions, 
which had been available under prior equity practice only in the most 
exceptional of circumstances.356 Even when these exceptional 
circumstances occurred, “any discovery that resulted was only 
accidental and incidental.”357 The expansion of discovery under the 
Rules included not only the availability of new mechanisms, but also 
expanded scope and breadth of the factual matters that discovery could 
explore,358 all with a reduction in judicial supervision.359 
It is now well-settled law that the Mathews test determines 
procedural due process whenever the Constitution does not already 
provide an answer. As noted earlier, even Justice Scalia, a leading 
originalist thinker, accepts this role for the Mathews test.360 Because 
modern discovery barely resembles any procedures existing before the 
twentieth century—let alone in the time of the Framers—applying the 
Mathews test to avoid discovery’s deprivations is entirely consistent 
with the originalist approach.  
This is not to suggest that procedural due process requires strict 
pleading rules as a method for containing discovery.361 Hardly so. 
                                                                                                                     
which drafted the Rules. He was also a Professor and Dean at Yale Law School, and later a 
Judge on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  
 354. Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderland and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 
MICH. L. REV. 6, 11 (1959).  
 355. Subrin, supra note 326, at 719 (citing Proceedings of the Advisory Committee on 
Uniform Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Court of the United States (Nov. 17, 1935) in 
Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference on Rules of Practice and Procedures, at CI-113-92).  
 356. STORY, supra note 342, §§ 1505–12, at 830–34 (discussing bills to perpetuate 
testimony, available only when there was a danger of the testimony being lost); id. §§ 1513–15, 
at 834–38 (testimony de bene esse and of persons abroad); Subrin, supra note 326, at 953; 
Subrin, supra note 326, at 699 (noting that the earlier Federal Rules of Equity provided for oral 
depositions only in “exceptional” circumstances). Professor Subrin noted that early equity 
practice was only an “embryonic discovery system.” Subrin, supra note 326, at 740.  
 357. 8 WRIGHT &  MILLER, supra note 164, § 2002.  
 358. Subrin, supra note 326, at 719.  
 359. Subrin, supra note 326, at 720–21.  
 360. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.  
 361. Indeed, Sunderland, the drafter of the Rules’ discovery provisions, suggested a 
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Rather, because modern discovery procedures go so far beyond 
anything known to courts in the Framers’ era, pleading standards must 
conform to the flexible, context-based, modern notions of procedural 
due process embodied in the Mathews test.  
3.  Twombly’s Standard Echoes Equity Practice of Framers’ Era 
To the extent that modern expansive discovery can trace its ancestry 
to late eighteenth century equity practice, that practice reasonably 
foreshadowed Twombly’s plausibility standard. Justice Story, in 
describing the availability of discovery in equity practice, repeatedly 
referred to a party’s need to state the basic operative facts to obtain 
discovery.  
For example, regarding discovery into property issues, Justice Story 
stated that “if a plaintiff comes into equity . . . he must obtain it upon 
the strength of his own case and his own evidence; and he is not entitled 
to extract from the conscience of the innocent defendant any proofs to 
support it.”362 Equity practice at that time did not allow parties to 
engage in the tangential discovery that has today become commonplace, 
as parties were “not at liberty to pry into the title of the adverse 
party.”363  
Blackstone confirms this understanding that equity required “setting 
forth the circumstances of the case at length” before subpoenas would 
issue.364 Indeed, had a founding-era plaintiff requested the discovery 
William Twombly did, on such bare facts, “his bill would most aptly be 
denominated a mere fishing bill.”365 Discovery practice in the Framers’ 
era thus presents no problems for applying Mathews to discovery, and 
even provides support.  
VI.   CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, rather 
than being a revolutionary change in pleading standards, is simply part 
of the Supreme Court’s continual expansion of the Mathews v. Eldridge 
three-factor balancing test.366 Indeed, the Twombly majority’s opinion 
addressed the three Mathews factors in their traditional order. And the 
majority discussed factors, such as the cost and individual 
inconveniences resulting from discovery, and the risks of erroneous 
deprivation, which would otherwise appear irrelevant to pleading 
standards.  
                                                                                                                     
limitation along these lines, but it was rejected. See Subrin, supra note 326, at 722.  
 362. STORY, supra note 342, § 1503, at 827 (emphasis added).  
 363. STORY, supra note 342, § 1490, at 815–16.  
 364. BLACKSTONE, supra note 338, at 442.  
 365. STORY, supra note 342, § 1497, at 822.  
 366. See supra Part III.B (discussing the Court’s continual expansion of Mathews).   
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There is no reason to think that the Mathews test would not or should 
not apply to discovery. As the Twombly majority made clear, discovery 
can easily deprive litigants of well-established property interests and 
liberty interests. And discovery relies upon the coercive power of the 
state for compliance, thereby requiring the protections of procedural due 
process. In Connecticut v. Doehr the Court unanimously struck down a 
prejudgment attachment statute as failing the Mathews test and thus 
violating procedural due process.367 Discovery is similar in all relevant 
respects to the attachment challenged in Doehr,368 potentially working 
deprivation of private interests and using the power of the state for the 
benefit of an adverse litigant. The alternative safeguard considered by 
the Twombly court, dismissing an implausible complaint, decreases the 
likelihood of erroneous deprivation and thus maintains procedural due 
process.  
Understanding Twombly as Mathews applied to discovery allows 
courts to draw on the well-developed framework and case law 
supporting the three-factor Mathews test. Applying the three Mathews 
factors to discovery deprivations is, moreover, well within the 
institutional competence of the federal judiciary. Using this recognized 
framework allows courts to avoid some of the questionable 
interpretations of Twombly, such as those that have led to a spike in 
dismissals of employment discrimination claims.369 An understanding 
of Twombly as Mathews applied to discovery not only makes Twombly 
appear less radical, but also ultimately promotes the just and efficient 
resolution of litigation. 
                                                                                                                     
 367. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11, 18 (1991). 
 368. In Doehr, the relevant deprivations were merely clouded title, impaired alienability, 
tainted credit, reduced chance of getting a home equity loan, and technical mortgage default. I . 
at 11. By contrast, discovery can cost excessive amounts of money, which is a well-recognized 
property interest, and “taking employees of a corporation out of work and holding them captive
in lawyers’ offices during depositions,” which violates liberty. Easterbrook, supra note 172, at 
645 (emphasis added). And “the Court has never held that only such extreme deprivations 
trigger due process concern.” Doehr, 501 U.S. at 12.  
 369. See supra Part V.D. 
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